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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT
STATE OF GEORGIA

o

MICROBILT CORPORATION,

*
*

Plaintiff,

v.
FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL INC.,
ct~.

Defendants,

*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

COPy
'~5~:,:'cr

r:

DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY GA

Civil Action No. 2003-CV-79446
(Business Division Two-EL)

ORDER ON ATTORNEYS' FEES
During oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Counterclaims held on May
31,2007, the Parties requested that the Court review and interpret section 12.6 "Attorneys' Fees" of
the software licensing agreement (the "Provision") between Plaintiff and Defendants' predecessor,
Credit Data Reporting Services, Inc., ("CDRS"). At issue is whether or not Defendants may be

o

entitled to any attorneys' fees under their existing set-off and recoupment defenses and the scope of
potential recovery. After reviewing the Provision, the Court finds as follows:
Contract construction is a question oflaw for the courts to determine. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1.
The Court must first detennine whether the language ofthe contract is ambiguous or clear. Holcim
(US), Inc., v. AMDG, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 818, 820 (2004). "[W]here the terms ofa written contract
are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone ... " Magnetic Resonance Plus,
Inc. v. Imaging Systems Intern., 272 Ga. 525, 526 (2001).
The Provision states:

o

If any sums due and owning under this Agreement are collected by or with the assistance of
legal counsel, or if either party brings suit of any type against the other party and prevails in
such action, then the non-prevailing party shall be liable to the prevailing party, and shall
promptly remit to the prevailing party upon demand, all ofthe prevailing party's costs and
expenses incurred with respect thereto, including without limitation court costs and
attorneys' fees.

---0----The Provision unambiguous states when a party is entitled to recover attorneys' fees.
Recovery of attorneys' fees is permitted under two circumstances: (I) upon the collection of "sums
due and owing" under the agreement with the assistance of counsel, and (2) upon bringing and
"prevailing" on any suit. The first prong ofthe Provision encompasses any amount collected through
Defendants' set-off and recoupment defenses. Therefore, it is unnecessary for Defendants to file
separate counterclaims in order to recover attorneys' fees associated with these claims.
The Provision is also unambiguous with respect to the scope of recovery. The "prevailing"
party may recover "costs and expenses incurred with respect thereto." Thus recovery of attorneys'
fees is limited to the costs and expenses associated with the successful prosecution of a claim, and
excludes those associated with the unsuccessful prosecution and/or defense of any claims.
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Additionally, this Court is bound by the rules defining a "prevailing party" established in Magnetic
Resonance Plus, Inc. v. Imaging Systems International. 272 Ga. 525, (2001) (holding that in the
absence oflanguage suggesting that "prevailing party" has a special meaning, the phrase shall be
construed consistent with statutory interpretation). In order to be entitled to recovery attorneys' fees,
the "prevailing party" must first be awarded some form of relief on the merits ofthe case, whether it
is monetary, equitable, or otherwise. Id. at 528. Thus, at trial, the issue of attorney's fees shall be
bifurcated from the jury's consideration of the substantive issues.
SO ORDERED this

(J

5 1Aday ofJune, 2007.
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Copies to:
Kevin HaITison Hudson, Esq.
Mary Lillian Walker, Esq.
Foltz Martin LLC
3525 Piedmont Road NE
Five Piedmont Center
Suite 750
Atlanta, GA 30305-1541

David L. Pardue, Esq.
A1ycia K. Jastrebski, Esq.
Hartman, Simons, Spielman & Wood LLP
6400 Powers Ferry Road NW
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30339
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